KAUST DepartmentComputer, Electrical and Mathematical Sciences and Engineering (CEMSE) Division
Electrical Engineering Program
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AbstractThe majority of the distributed learning literature focuses on convergence to Nash equilibria. Coarse correlated equilibria, on the other hand, can often characterize more efficient collective behavior than even the best Nash equilibrium. However, there are no existing distributed learning algorithms that converge to specific coarse correlated equilibria. In this paper, we provide one such algorithm, which guarantees that the agents’ collective joint strategy will constitute an efficient coarse correlated equilibrium with high probability. The key to attaining efficient correlated behavior through distributed learning involves incorporating a common random signal into the learning environment.
CitationBorowski HP, Marden JR, Shamma JS (2018) Learning to Play Efficient Coarse Correlated Equilibria. Dynamic Games and Applications. Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13235-018-0244-z.
SponsorsThis research was supported by ONR grant #N00014-17-1-2060, NSF grant #ECCS-1638214, the NASA Aeronautics scholarship program, the Philanthropic Educational Organization, and the Zonta International Amelia Earhart fellowship program, and funding from King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST).
JournalDynamic Games and Applications