• Login
    View Item 
    •   Home
    • Research
    • Conference Papers
    • View Item
    •   Home
    • Research
    • Conference Papers
    • View Item
    JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

    Browse

    All of KAUSTCommunitiesIssue DateSubmit DateThis CollectionIssue DateSubmit Date

    My Account

    Login

    Quick Links

    Open Access PolicyORCID LibguideTheses and Dissertations LibguideSubmit an Item

    Statistics

    Display statistics

    Passivity analysis of higher order evolutionary dynamics and population games

    • CSV
    • RefMan
    • EndNote
    • BibTex
    • RefWorks
    Type
    Conference Paper
    Authors
    Mabrok, Mohamed
    Shamma, Jeff S. cc
    KAUST Department
    Computer, Electrical and Mathematical Sciences and Engineering (CEMSE) Division
    Electrical Engineering Program
    Date
    2017-01-05
    Preprint Posting Date
    2016-09-16
    Online Publication Date
    2017-01-05
    Print Publication Date
    2016-12
    Permanent link to this record
    http://hdl.handle.net/10754/622792
    
    Metadata
    Show full item record
    Abstract
    Evolutionary dynamics describe how the population composition changes in response to the fitness levels, resulting in a closed-loop feedback system. Recent work established a connection between passivity theory and certain classes of population games, namely so-called “stable games”. In particular, it was shown that a combination of stable games and (an analogue of) passive evolutionary dynamics results in stable convergence to Nash equilibrium. This paper considers the converse question of necessary conditions for evolutionary dynamics to exhibit stable behaviors for all generalized stable games. Using methods from robust control analysis, we show that if an evolutionary dynamic does not satisfy a passivity property, then it is possible to construct a generalized stable game that results in instability. The results are illustrated on selected evolutionary dynamics with particular attention to replicator dynamics, which are also shown to be lossless, a special class of passive systems.
    Citation
    Mabrok MA, Shamma JS (2016) Passivity analysis of higher order evolutionary dynamics and population games. 2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control (CDC). Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2016.7799211.
    Sponsors
    Research supported by funding from KAUST.
    Publisher
    Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
    Journal
    2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)
    DOI
    10.1109/CDC.2016.7799211
    arXiv
    1609.04952
    Additional Links
    http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7799211/
    ae974a485f413a2113503eed53cd6c53
    10.1109/CDC.2016.7799211
    Scopus Count
    Collections
    Conference Papers; Electrical and Computer Engineering Program; Computer, Electrical and Mathematical Science and Engineering (CEMSE) Division

    entitlement

     
    DSpace software copyright © 2002-2022  DuraSpace
    Quick Guide | Contact Us | KAUST University Library
    Open Repository is a service hosted by 
    Atmire NV
     

    Export search results

    The export option will allow you to export the current search results of the entered query to a file. Different formats are available for download. To export the items, click on the button corresponding with the preferred download format.

    By default, clicking on the export buttons will result in a download of the allowed maximum amount of items. For anonymous users the allowed maximum amount is 50 search results.

    To select a subset of the search results, click "Selective Export" button and make a selection of the items you want to export. The amount of items that can be exported at once is similarly restricted as the full export.

    After making a selection, click one of the export format buttons. The amount of items that will be exported is indicated in the bubble next to export format.