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AbstractIt is known that global games with noisy sharing of information do not admit a certain type of threshold policies . Motivated by this result, we investigate the existence of threshold-type policies on global games with noisy sharing of information and show that such equilibrium strategies exist and are unique if the sharing of information happens over a sufficiently noisy environment. To show this result, we establish that if a threshold function is an equilibrium strategy, then it will be a solution to a fixed point equation. Then, we show that for a sufficiently noisy environment, the functional fixed point equation leads to a contraction mapping, and hence, its iterations converge to a unique continuous threshold policy.
CitationMahdavifar, H., Beirami, A., Touri, B. and Shamma, J.S., 2015, December. Threshold policy for global games with noisy information sharing. In Decision and Control (CDC), 2015 IEEE 54th Annual Conference on (pp. 5865-5870). IEEE.
Conference/Event name2015 54th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)