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    Wind energy aggregation: A coalitional game approach

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    Type
    Conference Paper
    Authors
    Baeyens, E.
    Bitar, E.Y.
    Khargonekar, P.P.
    Poolla, K.
    KAUST Grant Number
    025478
    Date
    2011-12
    Permanent link to this record
    http://hdl.handle.net/10754/600196
    
    Metadata
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    Abstract
    In this paper we explore the extent to which a group of N wind power producers can exploit the statistical benefits of aggregation and quantity risk sharing by forming a willing coalition to pool their variable power to jointly offer their aggregate power output as single entity into a forward energy market. We prove that wind power generators will always improve their expected profit when they aggregate their generated power and use tools from coalitional game theory to design fair sharing mechanisms to allocate the payoff among the coalition participants. We show that the corresponding coalitional game is super-additive and has a nonempty core. Hence, there always exists a mechanism for profit-sharing that makes the coalition stable. However, the game is not convex and the celebrated Shapley value may not belong to the core of the game. An allocation mechanism that minimizes the worst-case dissatisfaction is proposed. © 2011 IEEE.
    Citation
    Baeyens E, Bitar EY, Khargonekar PP, Poolla K (2011) Wind energy aggregation: A coalitional game approach. IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference. Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2011.6160785.
    Sponsors
    Supported in part by OOF991-KAUST US LIMITED under awardnumber 025478, the UC Discovery Grant ele07-10283 under the IMPACTprogram, NSF under Grant EECS-0925337, the Florida Energy SystemsConsortium, and Plan Nacional I+D+I of Spain under grant DPI2008-05795.
    Publisher
    Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
    Journal
    IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference
    DOI
    10.1109/CDC.2011.6160785
    ae974a485f413a2113503eed53cd6c53
    10.1109/CDC.2011.6160785
    Scopus Count
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