Smart grid data integrity attacks: characterizations and countermeasures<sup>π</sup>
KAUST Grant Number025478
Permanent link to this recordhttp://hdl.handle.net/10754/599649
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AbstractCoordinated cyberattacks of power meter readings can be arranged to be undetectable by any bad data detection algorithm in the power system state estimation process. These unobservable attacks present a potentially serious threat to grid operations. Of particular interest are sparse attacks that involve the compromise of a modest number of meter readings. An efficient algorithm to find all unobservable attacks [under standard DC load flow approximations] involving the compromise of exactly two power injection meters and an arbitrary number of line power meters is presented. This requires O(n 2m) flops for a power system with n buses and m line meters. If all lines are metered, there exist canonical forms that characterize all 3, 4, and 5-sparse unobservable attacks. These can be quickly detected in power systems using standard graph algorithms. Known-secure phasor measurement units [PMUs] can be used as countermeasures against an arbitrary collection of cyberattacks. Finding the minimum number of necessary PMUs is NP-hard. It is shown that p + 1 PMUs at carefully chosen buses are sufficient to neutralize a collection of p cyberattacks. © 2011 IEEE.
CitationGiani A, Bitar E, Garcia M, McQueen M, Khargonekar P, et al. (2011) Smart grid data integrity attacks: characterizations and countermeasuresπ 2011 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm). Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/SmartGridComm.2011.6102324.
SponsorsSupported in part by OOF991-KAUST US LIMITED under awardnumber 025478, the UC Discovery Grant ele07-10283 under theIMPACT program, and NSF under Grant EECS-0925337, the FloridaEnergy Systems Consortium, and Idaho National Labs.