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    Bonus payments as an anti-corruption instrument: A theoretical approach

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    Type
    Article
    Authors
    Cracau, Daniel
    Franz, Benjamin
    KAUST Grant Number
    KUK-C1-013-04
    Date
    2013-07
    Permanent link to this record
    http://hdl.handle.net/10754/597689
    
    Metadata
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    Abstract
    We analyse bonus payments for officials, who transfer payments truthfully to the government rather than collecting bribes. We show that optimised bonus payments are always beneficial to the government, making them a more effective anti-corruption measure than simple wage increases. © 2013 Elsevier B.V.
    Citation
    Cracau D, Franz B (2013) Bonus payments as an anti-corruption instrument: A theoretical approach. Economics Letters 120: 1–4. Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.036.
    Sponsors
    We are very grateful to Eugen Dimant and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions.The second author would like to thank the financial support from the European Research Council under the European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme FP7/2007–2013/ERC grant agreement No. 239870. His work is also partly supported by Award No KUK-C1-013-04, made by King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST).
    Publisher
    Elsevier BV
    Journal
    Economics Letters
    DOI
    10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.036
    ae974a485f413a2113503eed53cd6c53
    10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.036
    Scopus Count
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