Bonus payments as an anti-corruption instrument: A theoretical approach
Type
ArticleAuthors
Cracau, DanielFranz, Benjamin
KAUST Grant Number
KUK-C1-013-04Date
2013-07Permanent link to this record
http://hdl.handle.net/10754/597689
Metadata
Show full item recordAbstract
We analyse bonus payments for officials, who transfer payments truthfully to the government rather than collecting bribes. We show that optimised bonus payments are always beneficial to the government, making them a more effective anti-corruption measure than simple wage increases. © 2013 Elsevier B.V.Citation
Cracau D, Franz B (2013) Bonus payments as an anti-corruption instrument: A theoretical approach. Economics Letters 120: 1–4. Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.036.Sponsors
We are very grateful to Eugen Dimant and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions.The second author would like to thank the financial support from the European Research Council under the European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme FP7/2007–2013/ERC grant agreement No. 239870. His work is also partly supported by Award No KUK-C1-013-04, made by King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST).Publisher
Elsevier BVJournal
Economics LettersISSN
0165-1765ae974a485f413a2113503eed53cd6c53
10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.036