On the Convergence of Piecewise Linear Strategic Interaction Dynamics on Networks
Type
ArticleKAUST Department
Computer, Electrical and Mathematical Sciences and Engineering (CEMSE) DivisionElectrical Engineering Program
Date
2015-09-11Online Publication Date
2015-09-11Print Publication Date
2016-06Permanent link to this record
http://hdl.handle.net/10754/584223
Metadata
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We prove that the piecewise linear best-response dynamical systems of strategic interactions are asymptotically convergent to their set of equilibria on any weighted undirected graph. We study various features of these dynamical systems, including the uniqueness and abundance properties of the set of equilibria and the emergence of unstable equilibria. We also introduce the novel notions of social equivalence and social dominance on directed graphs, and demonstrate some of their interesting implications, including their correspondence to consensus and chromatic number of partite graphs. Examples illustrate our results.Citation
On the Convergence of Piecewise Linear Strategic Interaction Dynamics on Networks 2015:1 IEEE Transactions on Automatic Controlae974a485f413a2113503eed53cd6c53
10.1109/TAC.2015.2477975