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dc.contributor.authorTouri, Behrouz
dc.contributor.authorShamma, Jeff S.
dc.date.accessioned2015-04-23T14:03:37Z
dc.date.available2015-04-23T14:03:37Z
dc.date.issued2014-12-15
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/CDC.2014.7040087
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10754/550510
dc.description.abstractWe provide a framework for the study of global games with noisy sharing of information. In contrast to the previous works where it is shown that an intuitive threshold policy is an equilibrium for such games, we show that noisy sharing of information leads to non-existence of such an equilibrium. We also investigate the group best-response dynamics of two groups of agents sharing the same information to threshold policies based on each group's observation and show the convergence of such dynamics.
dc.publisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
dc.relation.urlhttp://ieeexplore.ieee.org/lpdocs/epic03/wrapper.htm?arnumber=7040087
dc.rights(c) 2014 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other users, including reprinting/ republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted components of this work in other works.
dc.titleGlobal games with noisy sharing of information
dc.typeConference Paper
dc.contributor.departmentComputer, Electrical and Mathematical Sciences and Engineering (CEMSE) Division
dc.identifier.journal53rd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
dc.conference.date15-17 Dec. 2014
dc.conference.nameDecision and Control (CDC), 2014 IEEE 53rd Annual Conference on
dc.conference.locationLos Angeles, CA
dc.eprint.versionPost-print
dc.contributor.institutionDepartment of Electrical, Computer, and Energy Engineering, University of Colorado, Boulder
dc.contributor.institutionSchool of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology
kaust.personShamma, Jeff S.
refterms.dateFOA2018-06-14T04:57:35Z


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