Mean-field games for marriage

Abstract
This article examines mean-field games for marriage. The results support the argument that optimizing the long-term well-being through effort and social feeling state distribution (mean-field) will help to stabilize marriage. However, if the cost of effort is very high, the couple fluctuates in a bad feeling state or the marriage breaks down. We then examine the influence of society on a couple using mean-field sentimental games. We show that, in mean-field equilibrium, the optimal effort is always higher than the one-shot optimal effort. We illustrate numerically the influence of the couple's network on their feeling states and their well-being. © 2014 Bauso et al.

Citation
Bauso D, Dia BM, Djehiche B, Tembine H, Tempone R (2014) Mean-Field Games for Marriage. PLoS ONE 9: e94933. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094933.

Publisher
Public Library of Science (PLoS)

Journal
PLoS ONE

DOI
10.1371/journal.pone.0094933

PubMed ID
24804835

PubMed Central ID
PMC4012996

arXiv
1404.3389

Additional Links
http://arxiv.org/abs/1404.3389

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