Finite stage asymmetric repeated games: Both players' viewpoints

Handle URI:
http://hdl.handle.net/10754/622893
Title:
Finite stage asymmetric repeated games: Both players' viewpoints
Authors:
Li, Lichun; Feron, Eric; Shamma, Jeff S. ( 0000-0001-5638-9551 )
Abstract:
In asymmetric zero-sum games, one player has superior information about the game over the other. It is known that the informed players (maximizer) face the tradeoff of exploiting its superior information at the cost of revealing its superior information, but the basic point of the uninformed player (minimizer)'s decision making remains unknown. This paper studies the finite stage asymmetric repeated games from both players' viewpoints, and derives that not only security strategies but also the opponents' corresponding best responses depends only on the informed player's history action sequences. Moreover, efficient LP formulations to compute both player's security strategies are provided.
KAUST Department:
Computer, Electrical and Mathematical Sciences and Engineering (CEMSE) Division; Electrical Engineering Program
Citation:
Li L, Feron E, Shamma JS (2016) Finite stage asymmetric repeated games: Both players’ viewpoints. 2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control (CDC). Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2016.7799083.
Publisher:
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Journal:
2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)
Conference/Event name:
55th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2016
Issue Date:
5-Jan-2017
DOI:
10.1109/CDC.2016.7799083
Type:
Conference Paper
Sponsors:
The authors acknowledge the financial support of ARO project #W911NF-09-1-0553 and the AFOSR/MURI project #FA9550-10-1-0573
Additional Links:
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7799083/
Appears in Collections:
Conference Papers; Electrical Engineering Program; Computer, Electrical and Mathematical Sciences and Engineering (CEMSE) Division

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.contributor.authorLi, Lichunen
dc.contributor.authorFeron, Ericen
dc.contributor.authorShamma, Jeff S.en
dc.date.accessioned2017-02-15T08:32:15Z-
dc.date.available2017-02-15T08:32:15Z-
dc.date.issued2017-01-05en
dc.identifier.citationLi L, Feron E, Shamma JS (2016) Finite stage asymmetric repeated games: Both players’ viewpoints. 2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control (CDC). Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2016.7799083.en
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/CDC.2016.7799083en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10754/622893-
dc.description.abstractIn asymmetric zero-sum games, one player has superior information about the game over the other. It is known that the informed players (maximizer) face the tradeoff of exploiting its superior information at the cost of revealing its superior information, but the basic point of the uninformed player (minimizer)'s decision making remains unknown. This paper studies the finite stage asymmetric repeated games from both players' viewpoints, and derives that not only security strategies but also the opponents' corresponding best responses depends only on the informed player's history action sequences. Moreover, efficient LP formulations to compute both player's security strategies are provided.en
dc.description.sponsorshipThe authors acknowledge the financial support of ARO project #W911NF-09-1-0553 and the AFOSR/MURI project #FA9550-10-1-0573en
dc.publisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)en
dc.relation.urlhttp://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7799083/en
dc.titleFinite stage asymmetric repeated games: Both players' viewpointsen
dc.typeConference Paperen
dc.contributor.departmentComputer, Electrical and Mathematical Sciences and Engineering (CEMSE) Divisionen
dc.contributor.departmentElectrical Engineering Programen
dc.identifier.journal2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)en
dc.conference.date2016-12-12 to 2016-12-14en
dc.conference.name55th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2016en
dc.conference.locationLas Vegas, NV, USAen
dc.contributor.institutionSchool of Electrical and Computer Engineering at Georgia Tech, United Statesen
dc.contributor.institutionSchool of Aerospace Engineering at Georgia Tech, United Statesen
dc.contributor.institutionSchool of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, United Statesen
kaust.authorShamma, Jeff S.en
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