Handle URI:
http://hdl.handle.net/10754/600196
Title:
Wind energy aggregation: A coalitional game approach
Authors:
Baeyens, E.; Bitar, E.Y.; Khargonekar, P.P.; Poolla, K.
Abstract:
In this paper we explore the extent to which a group of N wind power producers can exploit the statistical benefits of aggregation and quantity risk sharing by forming a willing coalition to pool their variable power to jointly offer their aggregate power output as single entity into a forward energy market. We prove that wind power generators will always improve their expected profit when they aggregate their generated power and use tools from coalitional game theory to design fair sharing mechanisms to allocate the payoff among the coalition participants. We show that the corresponding coalitional game is super-additive and has a nonempty core. Hence, there always exists a mechanism for profit-sharing that makes the coalition stable. However, the game is not convex and the celebrated Shapley value may not belong to the core of the game. An allocation mechanism that minimizes the worst-case dissatisfaction is proposed. © 2011 IEEE.
Citation:
Baeyens E, Bitar EY, Khargonekar PP, Poolla K (2011) Wind energy aggregation: A coalitional game approach. IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference. Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2011.6160785.
Publisher:
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Journal:
IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference
KAUST Grant Number:
025478
Issue Date:
Dec-2011
DOI:
10.1109/CDC.2011.6160785
Type:
Conference Paper
Sponsors:
Supported in part by OOF991-KAUST US LIMITED under awardnumber 025478, the UC Discovery Grant ele07-10283 under the IMPACTprogram, NSF under Grant EECS-0925337, the Florida Energy SystemsConsortium, and Plan Nacional I+D+I of Spain under grant DPI2008-05795.
Appears in Collections:
Publications Acknowledging KAUST Support

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.contributor.authorBaeyens, E.en
dc.contributor.authorBitar, E.Y.en
dc.contributor.authorKhargonekar, P.P.en
dc.contributor.authorPoolla, K.en
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-28T06:44:59Zen
dc.date.available2016-02-28T06:44:59Zen
dc.date.issued2011-12en
dc.identifier.citationBaeyens E, Bitar EY, Khargonekar PP, Poolla K (2011) Wind energy aggregation: A coalitional game approach. IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference. Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2011.6160785.en
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/CDC.2011.6160785en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10754/600196en
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we explore the extent to which a group of N wind power producers can exploit the statistical benefits of aggregation and quantity risk sharing by forming a willing coalition to pool their variable power to jointly offer their aggregate power output as single entity into a forward energy market. We prove that wind power generators will always improve their expected profit when they aggregate their generated power and use tools from coalitional game theory to design fair sharing mechanisms to allocate the payoff among the coalition participants. We show that the corresponding coalitional game is super-additive and has a nonempty core. Hence, there always exists a mechanism for profit-sharing that makes the coalition stable. However, the game is not convex and the celebrated Shapley value may not belong to the core of the game. An allocation mechanism that minimizes the worst-case dissatisfaction is proposed. © 2011 IEEE.en
dc.description.sponsorshipSupported in part by OOF991-KAUST US LIMITED under awardnumber 025478, the UC Discovery Grant ele07-10283 under the IMPACTprogram, NSF under Grant EECS-0925337, the Florida Energy SystemsConsortium, and Plan Nacional I+D+I of Spain under grant DPI2008-05795.en
dc.publisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)en
dc.titleWind energy aggregation: A coalitional game approachen
dc.typeConference Paperen
dc.identifier.journalIEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conferenceen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversidad de Valladolid, Valladolid, Spainen
dc.contributor.institutionUC Berkeley, Berkeley, United Statesen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of Florida, Gainesville, United Statesen
kaust.grant.number025478en
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