Smart grid data integrity attacks: characterizations and countermeasuresπ

Handle URI:
http://hdl.handle.net/10754/599649
Title:
Smart grid data integrity attacks: characterizations and countermeasures<sup>&#x03C0;</sup>
Authors:
Giani, Annarita; Bitar, Eilyan; Garcia, Manuel; McQueen, Miles; Khargonekar, Pramod; Poolla, Kameshwar
Abstract:
Coordinated cyberattacks of power meter readings can be arranged to be undetectable by any bad data detection algorithm in the power system state estimation process. These unobservable attacks present a potentially serious threat to grid operations. Of particular interest are sparse attacks that involve the compromise of a modest number of meter readings. An efficient algorithm to find all unobservable attacks [under standard DC load flow approximations] involving the compromise of exactly two power injection meters and an arbitrary number of line power meters is presented. This requires O(n 2m) flops for a power system with n buses and m line meters. If all lines are metered, there exist canonical forms that characterize all 3, 4, and 5-sparse unobservable attacks. These can be quickly detected in power systems using standard graph algorithms. Known-secure phasor measurement units [PMUs] can be used as countermeasures against an arbitrary collection of cyberattacks. Finding the minimum number of necessary PMUs is NP-hard. It is shown that p + 1 PMUs at carefully chosen buses are sufficient to neutralize a collection of p cyberattacks. © 2011 IEEE.
Citation:
Giani A, Bitar E, Garcia M, McQueen M, Khargonekar P, et al. (2011) Smart grid data integrity attacks: characterizations and countermeasures&#x03C0; 2011 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm). Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/SmartGridComm.2011.6102324.
Publisher:
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Journal:
2011 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm)
KAUST Grant Number:
025478
Issue Date:
Oct-2011
DOI:
10.1109/SmartGridComm.2011.6102324
Type:
Conference Paper
Sponsors:
Supported in part by OOF991-KAUST US LIMITED under awardnumber 025478, the UC Discovery Grant ele07-10283 under theIMPACT program, and NSF under Grant EECS-0925337, the FloridaEnergy Systems Consortium, and Idaho National Labs.
Appears in Collections:
Publications Acknowledging KAUST Support

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.contributor.authorGiani, Annaritaen
dc.contributor.authorBitar, Eilyanen
dc.contributor.authorGarcia, Manuelen
dc.contributor.authorMcQueen, Milesen
dc.contributor.authorKhargonekar, Pramoden
dc.contributor.authorPoolla, Kameshwaren
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-28T06:06:40Zen
dc.date.available2016-02-28T06:06:40Zen
dc.date.issued2011-10en
dc.identifier.citationGiani A, Bitar E, Garcia M, McQueen M, Khargonekar P, et al. (2011) Smart grid data integrity attacks: characterizations and countermeasures&#x03C0; 2011 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm). Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/SmartGridComm.2011.6102324.en
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/SmartGridComm.2011.6102324en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10754/599649en
dc.description.abstractCoordinated cyberattacks of power meter readings can be arranged to be undetectable by any bad data detection algorithm in the power system state estimation process. These unobservable attacks present a potentially serious threat to grid operations. Of particular interest are sparse attacks that involve the compromise of a modest number of meter readings. An efficient algorithm to find all unobservable attacks [under standard DC load flow approximations] involving the compromise of exactly two power injection meters and an arbitrary number of line power meters is presented. This requires O(n 2m) flops for a power system with n buses and m line meters. If all lines are metered, there exist canonical forms that characterize all 3, 4, and 5-sparse unobservable attacks. These can be quickly detected in power systems using standard graph algorithms. Known-secure phasor measurement units [PMUs] can be used as countermeasures against an arbitrary collection of cyberattacks. Finding the minimum number of necessary PMUs is NP-hard. It is shown that p + 1 PMUs at carefully chosen buses are sufficient to neutralize a collection of p cyberattacks. © 2011 IEEE.en
dc.description.sponsorshipSupported in part by OOF991-KAUST US LIMITED under awardnumber 025478, the UC Discovery Grant ele07-10283 under theIMPACT program, and NSF under Grant EECS-0925337, the FloridaEnergy Systems Consortium, and Idaho National Labs.en
dc.publisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)en
dc.subjectcybersecurityen
dc.subjectintegrity attacksen
dc.subjectobservabilityen
dc.subjectSmart Griden
dc.subjectsynchro-phasorsen
dc.titleSmart grid data integrity attacks: characterizations and countermeasures<sup>&#x03C0;</sup>en
dc.typeConference Paperen
dc.identifier.journal2011 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm)en
dc.contributor.institutionUC Berkeley, Berkeley, United Statesen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of Florida, Gainesville, United Statesen
kaust.grant.number025478en
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