Bonus payments as an anti-corruption instrument: A theoretical approach

Handle URI:
http://hdl.handle.net/10754/597689
Title:
Bonus payments as an anti-corruption instrument: A theoretical approach
Authors:
Cracau, Daniel; Franz, Benjamin
Abstract:
We analyse bonus payments for officials, who transfer payments truthfully to the government rather than collecting bribes. We show that optimised bonus payments are always beneficial to the government, making them a more effective anti-corruption measure than simple wage increases. © 2013 Elsevier B.V.
Citation:
Cracau D, Franz B (2013) Bonus payments as an anti-corruption instrument: A theoretical approach. Economics Letters 120: 1–4. Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.036.
Publisher:
Elsevier BV
Journal:
Economics Letters
KAUST Grant Number:
KUK-C1-013-04
Issue Date:
Jul-2013
DOI:
10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.036
Type:
Article
ISSN:
0165-1765
Sponsors:
We are very grateful to Eugen Dimant and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions.The second author would like to thank the financial support from the European Research Council under the European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme FP7/2007–2013/ERC grant agreement No. 239870. His work is also partly supported by Award No KUK-C1-013-04, made by King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST).
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Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.contributor.authorCracau, Danielen
dc.contributor.authorFranz, Benjaminen
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-25T12:44:27Zen
dc.date.available2016-02-25T12:44:27Zen
dc.date.issued2013-07en
dc.identifier.citationCracau D, Franz B (2013) Bonus payments as an anti-corruption instrument: A theoretical approach. Economics Letters 120: 1–4. Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.036.en
dc.identifier.issn0165-1765en
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.036en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10754/597689en
dc.description.abstractWe analyse bonus payments for officials, who transfer payments truthfully to the government rather than collecting bribes. We show that optimised bonus payments are always beneficial to the government, making them a more effective anti-corruption measure than simple wage increases. © 2013 Elsevier B.V.en
dc.description.sponsorshipWe are very grateful to Eugen Dimant and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions.The second author would like to thank the financial support from the European Research Council under the European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme FP7/2007–2013/ERC grant agreement No. 239870. His work is also partly supported by Award No KUK-C1-013-04, made by King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST).en
dc.publisherElsevier BVen
dc.subjectC7en
dc.subjectCorruptionen
dc.subjectJ3en
dc.subjectK4en
dc.subjectMonetary incentivesen
dc.subjectPrincipal-agent gameen
dc.titleBonus payments as an anti-corruption instrument: A theoretical approachen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.journalEconomics Lettersen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversitat Magdeburg, Magdeburg, Germanyen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdomen
kaust.grant.numberKUK-C1-013-04en
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