On the Convergence of Piecewise Linear Strategic Interaction Dynamics on Networks

Handle URI:
http://hdl.handle.net/10754/584223
Title:
On the Convergence of Piecewise Linear Strategic Interaction Dynamics on Networks
Authors:
Gharesifard, Bahman; Touri, Behrouz; Basar, Tamer; Shamma, Jeff S. ( 0000-0001-5638-9551 )
Abstract:
We prove that the piecewise linear best-response dynamical systems of strategic interactions are asymptotically convergent to their set of equilibria on any weighted undirected graph. We study various features of these dynamical systems, including the uniqueness and abundance properties of the set of equilibria and the emergence of unstable equilibria. We also introduce the novel notions of social equivalence and social dominance on directed graphs, and demonstrate some of their interesting implications, including their correspondence to consensus and chromatic number of partite graphs. Examples illustrate our results.
KAUST Department:
Computer, Electrical and Mathematical Sciences and Engineering (CEMSE) Division
Citation:
On the Convergence of Piecewise Linear Strategic Interaction Dynamics on Networks 2015:1 IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
Publisher:
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Journal:
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
Issue Date:
11-Sep-2015
DOI:
10.1109/TAC.2015.2477975
Type:
Article
ISSN:
0018-9286; 1558-2523
Additional Links:
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/lpdocs/epic03/wrapper.htm?arnumber=7258336
Appears in Collections:
Articles; Computer, Electrical and Mathematical Sciences and Engineering (CEMSE) Division

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.contributor.authorGharesifard, Bahmanen
dc.contributor.authorTouri, Behrouzen
dc.contributor.authorBasar, Tameren
dc.contributor.authorShamma, Jeff S.en
dc.date.accessioned2015-12-21T08:21:32Zen
dc.date.available2015-12-21T08:21:32Zen
dc.date.issued2015-09-11en
dc.identifier.citationOn the Convergence of Piecewise Linear Strategic Interaction Dynamics on Networks 2015:1 IEEE Transactions on Automatic Controlen
dc.identifier.issn0018-9286en
dc.identifier.issn1558-2523en
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/TAC.2015.2477975en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10754/584223en
dc.description.abstractWe prove that the piecewise linear best-response dynamical systems of strategic interactions are asymptotically convergent to their set of equilibria on any weighted undirected graph. We study various features of these dynamical systems, including the uniqueness and abundance properties of the set of equilibria and the emergence of unstable equilibria. We also introduce the novel notions of social equivalence and social dominance on directed graphs, and demonstrate some of their interesting implications, including their correspondence to consensus and chromatic number of partite graphs. Examples illustrate our results.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)en
dc.relation.urlhttp://ieeexplore.ieee.org/lpdocs/epic03/wrapper.htm?arnumber=7258336en
dc.rights(c) 2015 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other users, including reprinting/ republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted components of this work in other works.en
dc.titleOn the Convergence of Piecewise Linear Strategic Interaction Dynamics on Networksen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.contributor.departmentComputer, Electrical and Mathematical Sciences and Engineering (CEMSE) Divisionen
dc.identifier.journalIEEE Transactions on Automatic Controlen
dc.eprint.versionPost-printen
dc.contributor.institutionQueen’s University, Canadaen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of Colorado Boulder, USAen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USAen
dc.contributor.affiliationKing Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST)en
kaust.authorShamma, Jeff S.en
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