Dynamics in atomic signaling games

Handle URI:
http://hdl.handle.net/10754/550665
Title:
Dynamics in atomic signaling games
Authors:
Fox, Michael J.; Touri, Behrouz; Shamma, Jeff S. ( 0000-0001-5638-9551 )
Abstract:
We study an atomic signaling game under stochastic evolutionary dynamics. There are a finite number of players who repeatedly update from a finite number of available languages/signaling strategies. Players imitate the most fit agents with high probability or mutate with low probability. We analyze the long-run distribution of states and show that, for sufficiently small mutation probability, its support is limited to efficient communication systems. We find that this behavior is insensitive to the particular choice of evolutionary dynamic, a property that is due to the game having a potential structure with a potential function corresponding to average fitness. Consequently, the model supports conclusions similar to those found in the literature on language competition. That is, we show that efficient languages eventually predominate the society while reproducing the empirical phenomenon of linguistic drift. The emergence of efficiency in the atomic case can be contrasted with results for non-atomic signaling games that establish the non-negligible possibility of convergence, under replicator dynamics, to states of unbounded efficiency loss.
KAUST Department:
Computer, Electrical and Mathematical Sciences and Engineering (CEMSE) Division
Citation:
Dynamics in atomic signaling games 2015, 376:82 Journal of Theoretical Biology
Publisher:
Elsevier
Journal:
Journal of Theoretical Biology
Issue Date:
8-Apr-2015
DOI:
10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.03.038
ARXIV:
arXiv:1312.5983
Type:
Article
ISSN:
00225193
Additional Links:
http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0022519315001538; http://arxiv.org/abs/1312.5983
Appears in Collections:
Articles; Computer, Electrical and Mathematical Sciences and Engineering (CEMSE) Division

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.contributor.authorFox, Michael J.en
dc.contributor.authorTouri, Behrouzen
dc.contributor.authorShamma, Jeff S.en
dc.date.accessioned2015-04-26T14:28:01Zen
dc.date.available2015-04-26T14:28:01Zen
dc.date.issued2015-04-08en
dc.identifier.citationDynamics in atomic signaling games 2015, 376:82 Journal of Theoretical Biologyen
dc.identifier.issn00225193en
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.03.038en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10754/550665en
dc.description.abstractWe study an atomic signaling game under stochastic evolutionary dynamics. There are a finite number of players who repeatedly update from a finite number of available languages/signaling strategies. Players imitate the most fit agents with high probability or mutate with low probability. We analyze the long-run distribution of states and show that, for sufficiently small mutation probability, its support is limited to efficient communication systems. We find that this behavior is insensitive to the particular choice of evolutionary dynamic, a property that is due to the game having a potential structure with a potential function corresponding to average fitness. Consequently, the model supports conclusions similar to those found in the literature on language competition. That is, we show that efficient languages eventually predominate the society while reproducing the empirical phenomenon of linguistic drift. The emergence of efficiency in the atomic case can be contrasted with results for non-atomic signaling games that establish the non-negligible possibility of convergence, under replicator dynamics, to states of unbounded efficiency loss.en
dc.publisherElsevieren
dc.relation.urlhttp://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0022519315001538en
dc.relation.urlhttp://arxiv.org/abs/1312.5983en
dc.rightsNOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Theoretical Biology. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Theoretical Biology, 8 April 2015. DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.03.038en
dc.subjectSignalingen
dc.subjectGame theoryen
dc.subjectLanguage evolutionen
dc.subjectStochastic stabilityen
dc.titleDynamics in atomic signaling gamesen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.contributor.departmentComputer, Electrical and Mathematical Sciences and Engineering (CEMSE) Divisionen
dc.identifier.journalJournal of Theoretical Biologyen
dc.eprint.versionPost-printen
dc.contributor.institutionSchool of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA 30332, USAen
dc.identifier.arxividarXiv:1312.5983en
kaust.authorShamma, Jeff S.en
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