Resilience of LTE networks against smart jamming attacks

Handle URI:
http://hdl.handle.net/10754/550515
Title:
Resilience of LTE networks against smart jamming attacks
Authors:
Aziz, Farhan M.; Shamma, Jeff S. ( 0000-0001-5638-9551 ) ; Stuber, Gordon L.
Abstract:
Commercial LTE networks are being studied for mission-critical applications, such as public safety and smart grid communications. In this paper, LTE networks are shown vulnerable to Denial-of-Service (DOS) and loss of service attacks from smart jammers, who may employ simple narrowband jamming techniques to attack without any need to hack the network or its users. We modeled the utilities of jamming and anti-jamming actions played by the jammer and the network under the framework of single-shot and repeated Bayesian games. In a single-shot game formulation the only Nash Equilibria (NE) are pure strategy equilibria at which network utility is severely compromised. We propose a repeated-game learning and strategy algorithm for the network that outperforms single-shot games by a significant margin. Furthermore, all of our proposed actions and algorithms can be implemented with current technology.
KAUST Department:
Computer, Electrical and Mathematical Sciences and Engineering (CEMSE) Division
Publisher:
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Journal:
2014 IEEE Global Communications Conference
Conference/Event name:
2014 IEEE Global Communications Conference, GLOBECOM 2014
Issue Date:
8-Dec-2014
DOI:
10.1109/GLOCOM.2014.7036895
Type:
Conference Paper
Additional Links:
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/lpdocs/epic03/wrapper.htm?arnumber=7036895
Appears in Collections:
Conference Papers; Computer, Electrical and Mathematical Sciences and Engineering (CEMSE) Division

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.contributor.authorAziz, Farhan M.en
dc.contributor.authorShamma, Jeff S.en
dc.contributor.authorStuber, Gordon L.en
dc.date.accessioned2015-04-23T14:15:43Zen
dc.date.available2015-04-23T14:15:43Zen
dc.date.issued2014-12-08en
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/GLOCOM.2014.7036895en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10754/550515en
dc.description.abstractCommercial LTE networks are being studied for mission-critical applications, such as public safety and smart grid communications. In this paper, LTE networks are shown vulnerable to Denial-of-Service (DOS) and loss of service attacks from smart jammers, who may employ simple narrowband jamming techniques to attack without any need to hack the network or its users. We modeled the utilities of jamming and anti-jamming actions played by the jammer and the network under the framework of single-shot and repeated Bayesian games. In a single-shot game formulation the only Nash Equilibria (NE) are pure strategy equilibria at which network utility is severely compromised. We propose a repeated-game learning and strategy algorithm for the network that outperforms single-shot games by a significant margin. Furthermore, all of our proposed actions and algorithms can be implemented with current technology.en
dc.publisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)en
dc.relation.urlhttp://ieeexplore.ieee.org/lpdocs/epic03/wrapper.htm?arnumber=7036895en
dc.rights(c) 2014 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other users, including reprinting/ republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted components of this work in other works.en
dc.subjectBayesian gamesen
dc.subjectGame theoryen
dc.subjectLTEen
dc.subjectanti-jammingen
dc.subjectcontrol channelsen
dc.subjectlearningen
dc.subjectrepeated gamesen
dc.subjectsmart jammingen
dc.titleResilience of LTE networks against smart jamming attacksen
dc.typeConference Paperen
dc.contributor.departmentComputer, Electrical and Mathematical Sciences and Engineering (CEMSE) Divisionen
dc.identifier.journal2014 IEEE Global Communications Conferenceen
dc.conference.date8 December 2014 through 12 December 2014en
dc.conference.name2014 IEEE Global Communications Conference, GLOBECOM 2014en
dc.eprint.versionPost-printen
dc.contributor.institutionSchool of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia 30332–0250en
kaust.authorShamma, Jeff S.en
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